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Abstract—After the discovery of adversarial examples and
their adverse effects on deep learning models, many studies
focused on finding more diverse methods to generate these
carefully crafted samples. Although empirical results on the
effectiveness of adversarial example generation methods against
defense mechanisms are discussed in detail in the literature, an
in-depth study of the theoretical properties and the perturbation
effectiveness of these adversarial attacks has largely been lacking.
In this paper, we investigate the objective functions of three
popular methods for adversarial example generation: the L-
BFGS attack, the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign attack, and
Carlini & Wagner’s attack. Specifically, we perform a compar-
ative and formal analysis of the loss functions underlying the
aforementioned attacks while laying out large-scale experimental
results on ImageNet dataset. This analysis exposes (1) the faster
optimization speed as well as the constrained optimization space
of the cross-entropy loss, (2) the detrimental effects of using the
signature of the cross-entropy loss on optimization precision as
well as optimization space, and (3) the slow optimization speed
of the logit loss in the context of adversariality. Our experiments
reveal that the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign attack, which is
thought to be fast for generating adversarial examples, is the
worst attack in terms of the number of iterations required to
create adversarial examples in the setting of equal perturbation.
Moreover, our experiments show that the underlying loss function
of Carlini & Wagner’s attack, which is criticized for being
substantially slower than other adversarial attacks, is not that
much slower than other loss functions. Finally, we analyze
how well neural networks can identify adversarial perturbations
generated by the attacks under consideration, hereby revisiting
the idea of adversarial retraining on ImageNet.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the groundbreaking results obtained by deep learning
models for different types of machine learning problems [1],
[2], studies that investigate the weaknesses of these models
also gained traction [3], [4], [5], [6]. From these studies,
it became clear that deep learning models are vulnerable to
gradient-based attacks that create so-called (negative) adver-
sarial examples. To counter these adversarial attacks, a number
Preprint. Accepted for publication on Pattern Recognition Letters, 2020.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2020.04.034.
of defense techniques have been proposed, only to be falsified
by follow-up studies [7].
As more attacks are proposed with each study, hereby
showing that the newly introduced methods are superior to
their predecessors by mostly empirical means, a mathematical
explanation as to why the proposed attacks are better than
others remains lacking. A similar observation can be made
regarding the availability of rigorous comparative analyses
of the proposed attacks. In this study, we aim at formally
explaining a number of properties of commonly used gradient-
based attacks, namely, the L-BFGS attack (L-BFGS), Iterative
Fast Gradient Sign (IFGS), and Carlini & Wagner’s attack
(CW). We investigate (1) why some of these attacks are
faster than others when generating adversarial examples [8]
and (2) why some of these attacks are creating stronger
adversarial examples that are more robust against state-of-the-
art defense mechanisms [9]. While doing so, we also analyze
the effectiveness of the perturbation generated by different loss
functions, in a setting where the total amount of perturbation
is held constant, so to allow for a fair comparison. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study that makes use of the
aforementioned setting in order to analyze the effectiveness of
perturbations that have been generated by adversarial attacks.
In this context, we first lay out the theoretical advantages
and disadvantages of the aforementioned attacks, subsequently
providing empirical results that are in support of our theo-
retical findings, and where the empirical results have been
obtained by performing large-scale experiments in the image
domain using the ImageNet dataset [10]. Finally, we analyze
whether or not various deep neural network architectures can
distinguish adversarial examples from genuine images.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly
outline our mathematical notations. In Section III, we first
provide a detailed review of the different methods used in
this study for adversarial example generation, subsequently
generalizing their objective functions in terms of how the
perturbation is generated. In Section IV, we analyze the
mathematical properties of the objective functions studied
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as. In Section V, we present experimental results. Finally,
we provide conclusions and directions for future research in
Section VI.
II. MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS
• X — an arbitrary image represented as a 3-D tensor
(depth × width × height), with values in the range of
[0, 1].
• y = g(θ,X) — a classification function that links X
to an output vector y of size M , containing predictions
made by a neural network that comes with parameters θ
and that does not contain a final softmax layer. M denotes
the total number of classes used. The k-th element of this
vector is referred to as g(θ,X)k.
• S(g(θ,X)) =
[
eg(θ,X)t∑M
m=1 e
g(θ,X)m
]M
t=1
— the vector gen-
erated by the softmax function. This function converts the
logits produced by the neural network into probabilistic
form.
• J(g(θ,X)c) = − log
(
eg(θ,X)c∑M
m=1 e
g(θ,X)m
)
— the cross-
entropy function (CE), which calculates the negative
logarithmic loss of the softmax prediction made by a
neural network for a class c.
• ∇xg(θ,X) — the partial derivative of a neural network
g with respect to an input X.
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE GENERATION METHODS
In the field of adversarial examples, a variety of attacks
exists [9], [3], [8], [11], [5], [12], [13]. However, in this
study, we only consider targeted adversarial attacks, given
that this type of attacks is typically preferred over untargeted
attacks when assessing the robustness of defense methods [7].
In that regard, we focus on three popular methods that are
frequently used for generating adversarial examples: the L-
BFGS attack, the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign attack, and
Carlini & Wagner’s attack.
L-BFGS: Box-constrained L-BFGS, as introduced by [13],
is one of the first widely used adversarial attacks. This attack
aims at finding an adversarial example X′ that is similar to
the input X under the L2 distance, but that gets assigned a
different label by the model. [13] expressed this problem in a
d-dimensional setting as follows:
minimize b · ||X−X′||22 − `(X′) ,
such that X′ ∈ [0, 1]d .
(1)
This minimization problem is repeatedly solved for multiple
values of b, using bisection search to find optimal perturba-
tions. A common choice for the loss function `, and one we
will also follow, is the cross-entropy function.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign: IFGS [8], also referred to as
the basic iterative method, finds its origin in the Fast Gradient
Sign (FGS) method proposed by [3]. The main objective
of both FGS and IFGS is to generate adversarial examples
quickly. As such, IFGS updates an image using the sign of
the gradient at each iteration as:
Xn+1 = ClipX,(Xn − α sign(∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c) . (2)
In the above equation, the perturbation is generated using the
signature of the cross-entropy loss, which we will refer to
as the CE-sign loss. The parameter  controls the maximally
allowed amount of perturbation per pixel, α determines the
amount of CE-generated perturbation added by each iteration,
and the clipping function ensures that the resulting adversarial
example remains a valid image. In this study, we opted for
IFGS over FGS, given that IFGS has been shown to produce
stronger adversarial examples [8]. CE-sign loss is also used
by Projected Gradient Descent Attack later proposed by [11].
Carlini & Wagner: [9] proposed a heavily optimized attack
which produces strong adversarial examples that can bypass
defense mechanisms easily. The L2 version of this attack,
which was also used by [7] to test the robustness of defense
mechanisms, is defined as follows:
miminize ||X− (X+ δ)||22 + `(X+ δ) , (3)
where this attack attempts to find a small perturbation δ that is
sufficient to change the prediction made by the model when it
is added to the input, while keeping the L2 distance between
the original image X and the perturbed image X′ = X + δ
minimal.
We will use the loss they preferred in their later work to
evaluate multiple defense mechanisms:
`(X′) = max
(
max{g(θ,X′)i : i 6= c} − g(θ,X′)c,−κ
)
,
(4)
where max{g(θ,X′)i : i 6= c} − g(θ,X′)c compares the logit
value of target class c with that of the next-most-likely class
i. The constant κ can be used to adjust the strength of the
produced adversarial example.
[9] refer to the loss function shown in Equation (4) as
logit loss, which is also commonly known as using the logits
to generate adversarial examples. However, throughout this
paper, and for the sake of clarity, we will use (1) the term logit
loss when maximizing a single target class using logits and (2)
the term multi-target logit loss (abbreviated as M-logit loss)
when we refer to the loss function of CW (the latter focuses on
two classes, namely the target class and the next-most-likely
class).
Generalizing Objective Functions: Although the objective
functions presented in this section differ in multiple ways and
are complex in nature, it is possible to generalize them in
terms of how the perturbation is generated. During each step,
these methods essentially aim at finding a perturbation that
increases the prediction likelihood of the target class. In order
to investigate properties of interest of the different methods
for adversarial example generation, like robustness and speed,
we first rewrite the objective functions of L-BFGS, IFGS, and
CW in a similar format, with this format explicitly displaying
the source of the generated perturbation. As mentioned before,
to generate the perturbation, L-BFGS uses CE loss, IFGS uses
0 20 40 60 80 100
Iteration
0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
In
iti
al
 c
la
ss
 so
ftm
ax
 o
ut
pu
t D1 D2 D3
0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Ta
rg
et
 c
la
ss
 so
ftm
ax
 o
ut
pu
t
Initial  class likelihood
Target class likelihood
Fig. 1: The prediction likelihood of both the initial class
and the target class is displayed throughout 100 iterations of
adversarial optimization. The lines represent the mean and
the shaded areas represent the 95% confidence interval of
likelihood values that have been obtained for 1, 000 adver-
sarial examples. The subspaces defined in Definition IV.1 are
highlighted as blue, green, and red areas, representing D1, D2,
and D3, respectively.
CE-sign loss, and CW uses M-logit loss. In order to display
the source of the perturbation, we rewrite the aforementioned
attacks as follows:
Xn+1 = ζ1
(
Xn + γ1
(∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c))) , (5)
Xn+1 = ζ2
(
Xn + γ2
(
sign
(∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c)))) , (6)
Xn+1 = ζ3
(
Xn + γ3 (∇xg(θ,Xn)c) + γ4 (∇xg(θ,Xn)c∗
))
,
(7)
where Equations (5), (6), and (7) correspond to adversarial
optimizations performed by L-BFGS, IFGS, and CW, respec-
tively. In the above equations, c refers to the target class, and
the γ-function, which is unique for each method, is used to
satisfy the properties of the generated perturbation and thus
encompasses, e.g., the perturbation multiplier and the clipping
function. The ζ-function, in its turn, is used to ensure that
the generated adversarial examples satisfy various constraints,
such as box-constraints and L2 distance minimization. In
Equation (7), the second-most-likely target class is referred
to as c∗.
By writing the adversarial optimizations in this way, it
becomes clear that, in order to analyze the properties of
adversarial example generation methods, the properties of the
loss functions must be investigated. Therefore, in the next
section, we will analyze the differences between the cross-
entropy loss ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) as used by L-BFGS, the cross-
entropy signature loss sign(∇xJ(g(θ,X)c)) as used by IFGS,
and the logit loss ∇xg(θ,X)c, whose extension M-logit loss
is used by CW.
IV. PROPERTIES OF LOSS FUNCTIONS IN ADVERSARIAL
SETTINGS
In the previous section, we wrote the objective functions
of different methods for adversarial example generation in
such a way that the techniques for perturbation generation
are comparable. In order to understand the limitations and
advantages of these techniques, we analyze their behavior for
various outputs of g(θ,X), hereby investigating the gradient
produced.
A data point selected for adversarial optimization is as-
sumed to be correctly classified first, and the aim is to
eventually change the prediction, so to force the machine
learning model under consideration to incorrectly classify the
data point selected (often with high confidence). Consider
Fig. 1, which shows the mean prediction likelihood for both
the initial class and the target class. This mean prediction like-
lihood was obtained by creating 1, 000 adversarial examples,
applying IFGS to samples taken from the ImageNet dataset.
A pretrained ResNet-50 [2] in white-box settings was used for
this small experiment.
As can be seen from Fig. 1, the adversarial optimization
causes the prediction likelihood of the initial class to decrease
and the prediction likelihood of the target class to increase.
Note that the method used for adversarial optimization does
not change the overall outcome, but only the rate of change in
the likelihoods. Indeed, the ImageNet samples are, in the end,
mostly classified as the target class, with confidence values on
average higher than 0.9.
Based on observations made for the above experiment, we
adopt the following definition.
Definition IV.1. Let y = g(θ,X) be a neural network that
maps an input X to an output vector y and let c be the
target class. Based on the softmax output S(g(θ,X)) of the
classification result, we define three subspaces D{1,2,3}:
• D1 — The input is classified with high confidence as
some class r other than the target class c: ∀X1 ∈ D1,
max(S(g(θ,X1))) ≥ 0.9 and argmax g(θ,X1) = r, r 6=
c.
• D2 — The input is classified with relatively low confi-
dence for any class: ∀X2 ∈ D2, max(S(g(θ,X2))) <
0.9.
• D3 — The input is classified with high confidence as
the target class c: ∀X3 ∈ D3, S(g(θ,X3)) ≥ 0.9 and
argmaxS(g(θ,X3)) = c.
The subspaces listed in Definition IV.1 are visualized in
Fig. 1. A data point that is selected for adversarial optimization
is assumed to be correctly classified (more-often-than-not
with high confidence), and hence resides in D1. The aim of
the adversarial example generation methods we discussed in
Section III is to move this data point from D1 to D3 in an
iterative manner, where it is eventually classified as the target
class. During this optimization process, the data point under
consideration inevitably passes through D2.
In what follows, we analyze the objective functions in more
detail, with the goal of answering the following question:
“what makes an objective function beneficial or detrimental
when generating adversarial examples?” In Section III, we
showed that it is possible to distinguish between adversarial
example generation methods by their usage of CE, CE-sign,
and logits. As a result, we investigate the limitations and
advantages of CE loss and CE-sign loss against logit loss in
the context of adversarial example generation.
A. Cross-Entropy Loss
The cross-entropy loss was, thanks to its desirable proper-
ties, one of the first loss functions used to generate adversarial
examples [13]. The following theorem describes the behavior
of the CE loss for the subspaces D{1,2,3}.
Theorem IV.2. Let y = g(θ,X) be a neural network, repre-
sented by a differentiable function g that maps an input X to
an output vector y, and assume that adversarial examples are
generated using the cross-entropy function J(g(θ,X)c).
Based on the subpaces described in Definition IV.1, the
gradient ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) of the cross-entropy function can be
approximated as follows:
• ∀X1 ∈ D1,
lim
X→X1
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = ∇xg(θ,X1)r −∇xg(θ,X1)c .
(8)
• ∀X2 ∈ D2,
lim
X→X2
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = (9)∑
m∈I\{c}
βm
(
∇xg(θ,X2)m −∇xg(θ,X2)c
)
,
with constants β1, . . . , βM subject to∑
m∈I\{c} |βm| < 1, where I = {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
• ∀X3 ∈ D3,
lim
X→X3
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = 0 . (10)
Theorem IV.2 is proved in the supplementary material.
Let us now discuss the outcome of Theorem IV.2 for the
data points that lie in D1, D2, and D3, respectively.
Optimization for Data Points in D1 — In this subspace,
where the data point under consideration is classified with
high confidence as any class other than the targeted one, using
the gradient of the CE loss produced by gradient descent, the
likelihood of the current class r will be minimized and, at
the same time, the likelihood of the target class c will be
maximized. This outcome naturally increases the optimization
speed compared to only maximizing the target class likelihood,
given the fact that the data points in D1 are classified as r.
CW, even though regarded as the attack that produces the
strongest adversarial examples, is also criticized for being
substantially slower (i.e., computationally more expensive)
than IFGS and L-BFGS [14]. This is not only because the
algorithm itself is complex (i.e., incorporating mechanisms
like multiple-starting-point gradient descent), but also because
CW uses M-logit loss instead of CE loss. As we have stated
above, CE loss, compared to logit loss, has a faster speed at
the start of the optimization (i.e., for the data points in D1)
and is thus able to change the prediction of the data point at
hand faster.
We will show empirical results on the ImageNet dataset in
support of the aforementioned claims in Section V.
Optimization for Data Points in D2 — A data point
located in subspace D2 is classified with low confidence as
one of the available classes. Once here, the optimization speed
starts to decrease because
∑
m∈I\{c} |βm| < 1, as can be seen
from Equation (9). This is different from the optimization in
D1, where, provided that the equation is written in the same
format, the gradient multiplier is 1.
Optimization for Data Points in D3 — In subspace D3, the
data point under consideration is already classified as the target
class with high confidence. In this case, the loss generated
with the cross-entropy approaches zero, which means that the
data point under consideration cannot be further optimized.
We will refer to this mathematical constraint of the CE loss
in an adversarial setting for data points that lie in D3 as the
mathematical limit of the optimization space of the CE loss.
The biggest difference between logit loss-based optimiza-
tion methods (e.g., CW) and CE loss-based optimization
methods (e.g., FGS, IFGS, and L-BFGS) can be observed for
the points that lie in D3. As we have shown in Theorem IV.2,
CE loss cannot generate any further gradient signal as soon
as the data point under consideration is classified with high
confidence as the target class. This constraint, as will become
clear from the examples, does not apply to logit loss-based
optimization methods, explaining why CW is able to create
arguably stronger adversarial examples.
B. Cross-Entropy Sign Loss
We also experimented with taking the signature of the
gradient of the CE loss, a method that was shown to be suc-
cessful in generating adversarial examples [3], [8]. Although
it is not clear whether or not this method was used in the
aforementioned papers to overcome the subspace limitation of
the CE loss that we previously laid out, we will show that
taking the signature does not alleviate the subspace limitation
of the CE loss in adversarial settings, and that it also brings
along its own detrimental properties.
Limited Optimization Space — Since the limit of the
gradient generated with the CE loss, for the data points in D3,
approaches zero, multiplying this gradient with a large number
is not sufficient to move the data point under consideration
deeper into D3. In computational settings with limited decimal
precision, when, in absolute value, the largest element of the
gradient matrix ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) for data points that reside in
D3 becomes smaller than the numerical precision used by ad-
versarial optimization (for example, 1e−8 for single precision
or 1e−16 for double precision), then ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) ≡ 0. As
a result, taking the signature of the gradient generated with
CE loss, and using it instead of the gradient itself, will not
further optimize the data points that lie in D3.
Eliminated Rate-of-Change Among Elements — Since
both FGS and IFGS take the signature of the gradient, only the
direction of the optimization is retained for individual elements
of the gradient, and information about the rate of change is
lost. As a result, the optimization step size for each element
becomes identical, which can hinder the optimization speed.
We will show in the upcoming section that, on average, FGS
and IFGS perform worse than direct usage of gradients in
terms of the total amount of perturbation added.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In support of our mathematical observations, we per-
formed two sets of large-scale experiments on the ImageNet
dataset [10]. The aim of the first set of experiments is to
reveal the properties of perturbations, as generated by the
attacks covered in Section III, and the aim of the second set of
experiments is to discover the degree of detectability of these
adversarial perturbations by neural networks.
A. Experimental Setup
We rely on the following method to generate the adversarial
examples:
Xn+1 = ζ
(
Xn + αPn
)
, (11)
CE loss: Pn = ∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c) , (12)
CE-sign loss: Pn = sign
(∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c)) , (13)
Logit loss: Pn = ∇xg(θ,Xn)c , (14)
M-logit loss: Pn = α′∇xg(θ,Xn)c + α∗∇xg(θ,Xn)c∗ ,
(15)
with g(θ,Xn)c − g(θ,Xn)c∗ = κ , (16)
where Equation (11) represents the general approach to create
adversarial examples, with Pn the perturbation added during
each iteration, and α the perturbation multiplier. In this specific
setting, the ζ-function is, again, used to ensure that the
generated adversarial examples satisfy the box constraints.
Equations (12) to (15) describe the source of perturbation for
the different methods. Note that we also include the logit loss
in order to continue the comparative analysis between the logit
loss, the CE loss, and CE-sign loss. In the case of the M-logit
loss, we follow the work of [9] and select κ = 20. To ensure
that Equation (16) holds for κ = 20, the multipliers α′ and α∗
are used to adjust the level of perturbation generated by their
respective sources.
B. Perturbation Analysis of Adversarial Attacks
To investigate the properties of the perturbation generated by
the different loss functions discussed in Section III, we conduct
two experiments on ImageNet using different settings: (1)
keeping the perturbation multiplier constant and (2) keeping
the perturbation itself equal. We generate 1, 000 adversarial
examples for each attack and for each experiment, using
a pretrained ResNet-50 network [2] in white-box settings,
hereby performing a detailed analysis of the properties of the
generated perturbations. These two large-scale experiments
generalize a simulation, of which the details can be found
in the supplementary material, performed in a controlled 2-
D setting, making it possible to easily visualize the behavior
of adversarial optimization when making use of different
objective functions.
TABLE I: Mean and standard deviation, for the experiments
“equal perturbation” and “equal multiplier”, of (1) the least
number of iterations of added perturbation needed to change
the prediction and (2) the time required to calculate the
perturbation (measured on a single Titan-X GPU).
Equal Multiplier Equal Perturbation
Iterations Time (s) Iterations Time (s)
CE 114± 71 4.25± 0.3 55± 28 5.6± 0.1
CE-Sign 80± 37 4.05± 0.2 116± 52 5.6± 0.1
Logit 134± 72 4.19± 0.2 80± 47 5.7± 0.1
M-Logit 126± 73 4.30± 0.27 95± 52 5.8± 0.1
Equal Multiplier — In studies that investigate adversarial
examples, the perturbation generated with various sources is
multiplied with a constant α and then added to the image in
order to create an adversarial example. In our first experiment,
we follow this common approach, using α = 5e − 4 for the
equations given in Section V to generate adversarial examples.
However, in order to make a detailed analysis, instead of
only analyzing the prediction, we also analyze the changes
in magnitude of the gradient throughout the optimization, as
well as the least amount of perturbation needed to change the
prediction.
Equal Perturbation — The gradient values produced de-
pend on the loss function used, the subspace the optimized data
point is located in, and the number of iterations executed thus
far. As a result, the produced gradient values may be different
in terms of their total magnitude. In order to make a fair
comparison of optimization speed across different types of loss
functions, we now diverge from the previous studies and adopt
a dynamic multiplier technique with α = β /
∑
i,j |Pi,j |.
This method adjusts the perturbation multiplier dynamically,
so to make the added perturbation in each step equal (in
terms of magnitude) across all methods for all iterations. The
purpose of this experiment is to show the effectiveness of each
perturbation produced using the aforementioned losses when
the added perturbation is held constant. Under these circum-
stances, we use β = 5 in order to calculate α dynamically.
Experimental Results — The experimental results obtained
are displayed in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and Table I. Specifically,
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, (a) shows the softmax output and (b)
shows the logit prediction for both the initial class and the
target class, for adversarial optimization using 250 iterations,
for both the experiment “equal multiplier” and “equal per-
turbation”. On the other hand, (c) in both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3
visualizes the least amount of perturbation required in order to
change the prediction to the target class, obtained once for all
adversarial examples when their prediction is changed for the
first time, with the amount of perturbation represented in the
form of box plots for the respective experiments. The average
number of iterations required to change the prediction of the
data point under consideration and its standard deviation, as
well as the total amount of time required to calculate the
perturbations (for a total of 250 iterations in terms of computer
time), are listed in Table I. Lastly, Fig. 4 shows the change in
gradient magnitude for the experiment “equal multiplier”.
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Fig. 2: (a) The softmax output and (b) the logit prediction for both the initial class and the target class is given for adversarial
optimization over 250 iterations, for the experiment “equal multiplier”. The values correspond to the mean value of 1, 000
samples, taken from ImageNet validation set. (c) The least amount of total added perturbation required to change the prediction
of the data points under consideration (the same data points are presented in (a) and (b)). Best viewed in color.
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Fig. 3: (a) The softmax output and (b) the logit prediction for both the initial class and the target class is given for adversarial
optimization over 250 iterations, for the experiment “equal perturbation”. The values correspond to the mean value of 1, 000
samples, taken from ImageNet validation set. (c) The least amount of total added perturbation required to change the prediction
of the data points under consideration (the same data points are presented in (a) and (b)). Best viewed in color.
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Fig. 4: Change in the magnitude of the gradient for the
experiment “equal multiplier”, for the data points presented
in Fig. 2.
Based on these results, we make the following observations:
• When the perturbation multiplier is held the same, the
magnitude of the produced gradient becomes substantially
different for each method, making this kind of experiments
unsuitable for analyzing how fast or slow a method is.
• The misconception that the CE-sign loss, as used by IFGS
and FGS, generates adversarial examples faster than the other
methods [9] stems from the fact that taking the signature
naturally boosts the gradient obtained from the model. This is
shown in Fig. 4, where the perturbation added by the CE-sign
loss is significantly larger than the perturbation added by other
approaches. However, when the perturbation is held constant,
the CE-sign becomes the least effective loss and creates
adversarial examples the slowest in terms of the number of
iterations needed.
• The CE loss, whose usage is criticized in the works of
[9], [7], on average, not only creates adversarial examples the
fastest when the perturbation is held constant, but also does
so with the least amount of total L2 perturbation compared to
other losses.
• Even when the perturbation multiplier is held the same
across all iterations, the gradient generated by the CE loss de-
creases as the optimization continues (see Fig. 4), confirming
the practicality of Theorem IV.2.
• Both the CE and the CE-sign loss have a limited optimiza-
tion space, as observed in Fig. 2b and Fig. 3b. This explains
why the losses that rely on CE are not able to create strong
adversarial examples.
• Although, on average, the M-logit loss creates adversarial
examples slower (95 iterations) than the logit loss (80 iter-
ations), we observe that its total added perturbation is less
than that of the logit loss. This means that more iterations of
added perturbation does not necessarily equate to a larger total
perturbation, further showing the effectiveness of the M-logit
loss, as used by [9].
(a) Genuine image (b) CE perturbation (c) CE-Sign perturbation (d) Logit perturbation (e) M-Logit perturbation
Fig. 5: (a) Genuine images taken from the ImageNet dataset and the added perturbation illustrated in the form of saliency
maps when the adversarial attacks are performed with (b) CE, (c) CE-Sign, (d) Logit, and (e) M-Logit losses.
• Even if the M-logit loss indeed seems to be the slowest
method, which confirms the criticism of [14], the computa-
tional time difference between each method and M-logit loss
is not substantial: the M-logit loss is, on average, only 3%
slower than the fastest method. What makes CW extremely
slow is its extensive search for the most effective perturbation,
as described in [9], and not its underlying loss function.
• Even though we observe a correlation between the total
amount of added perturbation in terms of L2 and L∞ dis-
tances, the results for the CE-sign loss are vastly different from
others. This is because taking the signature gets rid of changes
with large magnitude, which will especially impact substantial
changes. This results in significantly smaller perturbations in
terms of L∞ distance.
C. Identification of Adversarial Perturbations
One of the first methods tested to prevent adversarial attacks
was the method of adversarial retraining [15]. This method is
performed by retraining the model under consideration with
adversarial examples while adding an additional ((M + 1)th)
adversarial class to the set of original classes. Adversarial
retraining was later extended by [16], with the authors training
a model in a binary fashion in order to obtain a discriminator
that distinguishes genuine images from adversarial ones. Be-
cause this experiment was performed with a limited number
of images and on datasets that are not fit to study adversarial
attacks (due to limitations in terms of (1) color channels
(MNIST [17]), (2) image sizes (CIFAR [18]), or (3) the total
number of images available), the method of adversarial retrain-
ing was later labeled as an ineffective defense mechanism [7].
In this experiment, we revisit the idea of adversarial retrain-
ing. For each attack described in Section V-A, we generate
50, 000 adversarial examples using a pretrained ResNet-50
network, taking initial images from the validation set of the
ImageNet dataset. This artificial dataset of 200, 000 adversarial
images is then utilized to train AlexNet [19], VGG-16 [20],
and ResNet-18/34/152 [2] in order to analyze whether these
neural networks can distinguish genuine images from adver-
sarial ones. In the first part of this experiment, we analyze the
detectability of adversarial examples for each attack separately
(i.e., models trained with genuine images and adversarial
examples generated with a single type of attack at a time). In
the second part, we incorporate adversarial examples generated
TABLE II: Accuracy (genuine / adversarial (overall)) of binary
classification between genuine images and adversarial exam-
ples, and where the adversarial examples have been generated
by the attacks listed in the first column for the given models.
Each entry containing three values represents the result of
an adversarial retraining. Architectures are ordered from the
left to the right in terms of ascending convolutional layer
complexity.
Attack AlexNet ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-34 ResNet-152
CE 88%30% 80%79% 94%90% 92%90% 96%94%
(59%) (79%) (92%) (91%) (95%)
CE-Sign 90%94% 97%96% 98%99% 99%99% 99%99%
(92%) (96%) (98%) (99%) (99%)
Logit 94%94% 95%96% 98%97% 98%99% 99%99%
(94%) (95%) (97%) (98%) (99%)
M-Logit 74%75% 90%91% 95%96% 96%96% 98%97%
(74%) (90%) (95%) (96%) (97%)
TABLE III: Breakdown of classification accuracy for genuine
images and adversarial examples when four types of attacks
are incorporated. Each column represents the result of an ad-
versarial retraining. Architectures are ordered from the left to
the right in terms of ascending convolutional layer complexity.
Attack AlexNet ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-34 ResNet-152
CE 53% 83% 95% 92% 93%
CE-Sign 76% 97% 99% 98% 99%
Logit 71% 95% 98% 97% 99%
M-Logit 52% 84% 96% 93% 94%
Adversarial
Examples 64% 90% 97% 95% 97%
Genuine
Images 81% 94% 93% 95% 99%
Overall
Accuracy 72% 92% 95% 95% 98%
with all four types of attacks, analyzing whether this approach
is effective as a defense mechanism and which types of attacks
are harder to detect.
A detailed description of the parameters used during the
training of these models, as well as dataset splits, can be found
in the supplementary material.
Experimental Results — Experimental results obtained for
adversarial retraining can be found in Table II and Table III,
with the former representing the classification accuracy when
models are retrained with genuine images and only one type
of adversarial examples, and with the latter showing the
classification accuracy when the adversarial retraining is done
with genuine images combined with all types of adversarial
examples. Furthermore, in Table III, next to providing the
classification accuracy of adversarial examples for each type
of attack, we also provide aggregate results in order to present
the detectability per attack type. Given the experimental results
shown in Table II and Table III, our findings can be summa-
rized as follows:
• Adversarial retraining requires massive amounts of data.
The reason why we had to generate such a large artificial
dataset was that any adversarial retraining effort conducted
with less than this amount of data produced inconsistent
results. This observation is also made by [16], where the
classifier trained achieved an accuracy of either 0% or 100%.
• Different from the study of [7], we find adversarial
retraining to be an effective method for detecting adversarial
examples that have been generated using ImageNet, for which
the perturbation patterns obtained are more distinctive than the
perturbation patterns obtained for datasets with smaller image
sizes (see Fig. 5 for perturbation examples).
• We observe a clear correlation between the capability of
the model (in terms of convolutional layer complexity) and
the ability of discriminating genuine images from adversarial
ones, an observation also made by [11].
• Confirming [16], we also find that adversarial examples,
as generated with CE-Sign, are the easiest to detect in com-
parison to other types of adversarial examples. In addition, we
find that adversarial examples generated with CE and M-Logit
are harder to detect when training incorporates all adversarial
examples.
• It might seem like CE is a decent baseline approach to
generate adversarial examples. However, due to its constrained
optimization space and limited perturbation generation ca-
pacity (as previously discussed in Section V-B), adversarial
examples generated with CE are less likely to transfer to other
models, and are more susceptible to defense mechanisms that
use input transformations such as total variation or blurring
[7].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we first generalized a number of popular
methods for adversarial example generation, making their
objective functions mathematically comparable in terms of
the way perturbation is generated. That way, we were able
to establish that each of these objective functions falls into
one out of two categories: the ones that use cross-entropy loss
and the ones that use logit loss. Next, we demonstrated that
the gradient of the cross-entropy loss can be approximated
differently for three prediction subspaces. We established both
mathematically and empirically that using the CE loss —
or any other loss function that, at its core, relies on CE —
has only a limited target subspace when creating adversarial
examples, as compared to the usage of the logit loss.
Our results show that, when the cross-entropy loss is used
as a baseline loss function to generate adversarial examples,
it is not possible to create adversarial examples whose logit
output exceeds a certain limit, due to mathematical constraints,
whereas it is possible to do so when using the logit loss.
However, this does not mean that the use of CE is always
detrimental to the process of adversarial example generation.
On the contrary, compared to all other methods studied in
this paper, the use of CE creates adversarial examples the
fastest and with the least amount of L2 perturbation. Next,
we observed that neural networks are indeed able to identify
adversarial perturbation patterns as generated by individual
attacks and that the method of adversarial retraining can be
used to differentiate genuine images from their adversarial
counterparts on ImageNet, given that the perturbation patterns
obtained for this dataset are more meaningful than the pertur-
bation patterns obtained for datasets with smaller image sizes.
With this study, we aim at guiding future research efforts
that focus on designing novel methods for adversarial example
generation, showing the impact of the selected baseline loss
function on the behavior of adversarial optimization. We
also aim at guiding future research efforts that focus on
constructing novel defenses against adversarial examples by
exposing the optimization space limitation of the cross-entropy
loss, which in turn enables defenses that focus on the different
subspaces we identified. Lastly, in the case of adversarial
retraining, and from a computer vision perspective, it may
be of interest to analyze what exactly the models are learning
in order to achieve a better understanding of the adversarial
perturbation patterns.
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VII. OMITTED PROOFS
Theorem 5.1 Let y = g(θ,X) be a neural network, represented by a differentiable function g that maps an input X to
an output vector y. Furthermore, assume that adversarial examples are generated using the cross-entropy function J(g(θ,X)c).
Based on the subpaces described in Definition (5.1) in the main text, the gradient ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) of the cross-entropy function
can be approximated as follows:
• ∀X1 ∈ D1,
lim
X→X1
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = ∇xg(θ,X1)r −∇xg(θ,X1)c . (17)
• ∀X2 ∈ D2,
lim
X→X2
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) =
∑
m∈I\{c}
βm
(
∇xg(θ,X2)m −∇xg(θ,X2)c
)
, (18)
with constants β1, . . . , βM subject to
∑
m∈I\{c} |βm| < 1, where I = {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
• ∀X3 ∈ D3, limX→X3 ∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = 0 . (19)
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Recall the formulae of the cross-entropy function J :
J(g(θ,X)c) = − log
(
eg(θ,X)c∑M
m=1 e
g(θ,X)m
)
, (20)
where c ∈ [1,M ] is the target label among M classes. We can rewrite the cross-entropy function as
J(g(X)c, θ) = −g(θ,X)c + log
(
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m
)
. (21)
To gain insight into the behavior of the cross-entropy loss, we will, given Equation 5 in the main text, analyze its gradient
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = ∇x
(
−g(θ,X)c + log
(
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m
))
, (22)
= −∇xg(θ,X)c +
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)m
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m
. (23)
Let us now consider Equation (23) for the different subspaces. Denote by I = {1, 2, . . . ,M} the set of class indices.
• When in subspace D1, each data point is classified with high confidence as belonging to some class r ∈ I \ {c}. Then,
∀X1 ∈ D1, we have eg(θ,X1)r  eg(θ,X1)m∈I\{r} . Hence,
lim
X→X1
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)m
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m
= ∇xg(θ,X1)r , (24)
which means that
lim
X→X1
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = ∇xg(θ,X1)r −∇xg(θ,X1)c . (25)
• While in subspace D3, each data point is classified, with high confidence, as belonging to the target class: ∀X3 ∈ D3,
eg(θ,X1)c  eg(θ,X1)m∈I\{c} . Thus,
lim
X→X3
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)m
M∑
m=1
eg(θ,X)m
= ∇xg(θ,X3)c . (26)
Therefore
lim
X→X3
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = 0 . (27)
• Finally, for subspace D2, we will first continue rewriting Equation (23):
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) = (28)
−∇xg(θ,X)c +
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)m∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
, (29)
= −
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)c∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
+
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m ∇xg(θ,X)m∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
, (30)
=
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
(
∇xg(θ,X)m −∇xg(θ,X)c
)
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
. (31)
For m = c, eg(θ,X)m (∇xg(θ,X)m −∇xg(θ,X)c) = 0. This means that the case m = c does not contribute to the sum and
that we can write Equation (31) as:
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) =
∑
m∈I\{c}
eg(θ,X)m
(
∇xg(θ,X)m −∇xg(θ,X)c
)
∑
m∈I
eg(θ,X)m
. (32)
Trivially, ∀m ∈ I , βm := eg(θ,X)m∑
m∈I eg(θ,X)m
< 1 since we know that ∀X2 ∈ D2. We can then represent the gradient as
lim
X→X2
∇xJ(g(θ,X)c) =
∑
m∈I\{c}
βm
(
∇xg(θ,X2)m −∇xg(θ,X2)c
)
(33)
with
∑
m∈I\{c}
|βm| < 1.
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
D1
D2
D3
Decision Boundary
Adversarial Trajectory Towards Class (R)
(a) Experimental setting
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0
2
4
(b) CE loss
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0
2
4
(c) Logit loss
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0
1
(d) CE sign loss
Fig. 6: (a) A classification problem consisting of two circular distributions with the same center (0, 0) but different radii.
The data are bounded by (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2. An adversarial trajectory is defined as moving a data point from the outer
class to the inner class across the decision boundary. Heat maps characterizing the adversarial optimization are given for
the classification problem presented in (a), generated using (b) the CE loss, log
(∑ |∇xJ(g(θ,X)(R))|); (c) the logit loss,
log
(∑ |∇xg(θ,X)(R)|); and (d) the CE sign loss, sign (∑ |∇xJ(g(θ,X)(R)))|).
VIII. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Experiments on 2-D — To visually demonstrate how adversarial optimization behaves for different objective functions,
we use the setting of adversarial example generation illustrated in Figure 6a. This experiment deals with a 2-D two-class
classification problem where the data are sampled using the function make circles of the SciPy library [21], obtaining two
circular data motifs with the same mean (0, 0), but different radii. To this problem, we apply a neural network with a single
hidden layer that contains 50 neurons followed by a rectifier activation [22]. Our model takes the 2-D coordinates (x, y) as
input and maps each point to one out of two target classes (R)ed and (B)lack. The circular decision boundary of this model
is drawn in black in Figure 6a. Under these settings, the adversarial example generation process is defined as moving a point
from the outer class (B) to the inner class (R), the latter thus acting as the target class.
The potency of the loss is visualized in the form of heat maps. Since the direction of optimization is different for different
points due to the circularity of the distributions, we use the absolute magnitude of the gradient in these heat maps. Figure 6b,
Figure 6c, and Figure 6d represents the magnitude of the gradients generated with CE loss, CE sign loss, and logit loss for
the points (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2, respectively. For each figure, we provide summarizing observations below:
• Figure 6b — The limited optimization space of the CE loss can be clearly observed, with the magnitude of the gradient
becoming zero as soon as data points in the target subspace D3 are selected.
• Figure 6c — When the logit loss is used, the gradient exists for all points (x, y) ∈ [−1, 1]2. Yet, for the logit loss, the
magnitude of the gradient for data points in D1 is less than the magnitude for the same data points when CE loss is
selected, which shows the benefit in terms of optimization speed when using CE loss over logit loss for the data points
that lie in D1.
• Figure 6d — The area that contains non-zero gradients in the target subspace D3 has increased compared to Figure 6b.
However, there still exists an area at the center of the graph where the magnitude of the gradient is exactly zero.
Adversarial Retraining Details — In what follows, we provide details about the data set and the training methodology used
for the experiments described in Section 5.2 of the main text.
• Architecture — For the adversarial retraining experiments, we adopt AlexNet [19], VGG-16 [20], and ResNet-18/34/152 [2],
performing weight initialization using the models available in the PyTorch library [23], pretrained on the ImageNet training
set. We then replace the final linear layer with another newly initialized layer that has two class outputs (one for genuine
images and one for adversarial images). The weights for this layer are initialized with the initialization method provided
in [2].
• Data set — We generate 50, 000 adversarial examples for each attack using a pretrained ResNet-50 network in white-box
settings, with initial images for the adversarial attacks taken from the images in the ImageNet validation set.
– Training on a single type of adversarial examples — The results provided in Table 2, as available in the main text,
were obtained by training the aforementioned architectures in a binary fashion, where the set of adversarial examples
only contains those adversarial examples generated by a single attack (provided in the first column of Table 2). For
training purposes, we use 47, 500 genuine images available in the ImageNet validation set and their 47, 500 adversarial
counterparts. The remaining 5, 000 images (half genuine, half adversarial) are used as a test set.
– Training on multiple types of adversarial examples — The results provided in Table 3, as available in the main
text, were obtained by training the aforementioned architectures in a binary fashion, where all adversarial examples
generated by all attacks are labeled as the adversarial class. We use 50, 000 genuine images available in the ImageNet
validation set and 200, 000 adversarial examples, with the latter generated from the aforementioned genuine images
by four types of attacks. Due to the imbalance between both classes, we incorporate 150, 000 extra genuine images
taken from the extended data set ImageNet-10K [24]. The reason for not using any images from the training set of
ImageNet is that the models we apply are already pretrained on the training set of ImageNet. The resulting data set of
400, 000 images is then split into 380, 000 and 20, 000 images in a stratified way for training and testing, respectively.
• Training methodology — For each model, we use the same training approach and parameter values (e.g., learning rate,
weight decay, and annealing) as provided in the respective papers. In addition to that, we also experimented with training
these models using Adaptive Momentum [25] with learning rates of 0.00001, 0.0001, and 0.001, and with a weight decay
of 0.0001. Unless specified otherwise in the respective papers, we train each model for 100 epochs and provide results
for that experiment that achieved the highest overall accuracy on the test sets described above.
